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INTRODUCTION 
The Great Recession of 2008, which began in the US and quickly spread to Europe, was one of the 
most significant economic shocks since the Great Depression of the 1930s, and the effects quickly 
rippled around the world. Company level employment practices are heavily influenced by the 
macroeconomic environment (Boxall and Macky, 2009; Cook et.al, 2016; Mitchell and Zaidi, 1990; 
Zagelmeyer and Gollan, 2012), and economic crisis may force firms to re-evaluate their business 
operations to remain competitive or simply to ensure survival.  While businesses may respond by 
reducing employment levels through downsizing (Cooper et.al, 2012; Datta and Basuil, 2015; 
Dencker, 2012; Goyer et.al, 2016; Johnstone, 2018), they may also make changes to employment 
practices.  Examples include freezing wages and bonuses, reducing overtime, diminishing 
opportunities of promotion, reallocating jobs and responsibilities, reducing expenditure on training 
and development, revising pension provision and adjusting working time (Ahlstrand, 2015; Cascio, 
2015; Gunnigle et.al, 2014; Lai et.al, 2016; Larsen and Navbjerg, 2015; Roche et.al, 2013; 
Strandholm et.al, 2013; Svalund et.al, 2013; Svalund, 2015; van Wanrooy et.al, 2013).   
Firms encountering severely depressed market conditions might implement a combination of 
employment adjustments (van Wanrooy et.al, 2013), and different approaches can be envisaged 
(Teague and Roche, 2014).  On the one hand, firms might focus primarily upon adjusting the size and 
composition of the workforce through headcount reductions.  This is an approach commonly 
associated with lightly regulated liberal market economies (Cascio, 2010).  On the other hand, firms 
might aim to mitigate job losses by utilising alternative measures to protect employment as part of a 
commitment to employment stabilisation or responsible restructuring (Cascio, 2005; 2010; 2015; 
Teague and Roche, 2014).  These may include temporary lay-offs, short-time working arrangements 
or the redeployment of workers to different roles.  Firms may also maintain a buffer of temporary 
workers to enable the company to reduce headcount while protecting ‘core’ workers when market 
conditions decline.    Such approaches are normally associated with the coordinated market economies 
of continental Europe, where ‘beneficial constraints’ may promote stable employment where possible 
(Cascio, 2010; 2015; Teague and Roche, 2014).  Thus, while we might anticipate general pressures to 
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cut costs and improve efficiency in crisis hit organisations, there are many ways this can be achieved, 
with quite different consequences for both businesses and employees.  As Bacon (2008) notes, “the 
effects of market pressure on strategic choice are complex…cost pressures do force managers to act to 
reduce labour costs although such pressures are not direct measures in exactly how to act”.   
As well as the immediate responses of firms to deteriorating market conditions are questions 
regarding the potential impact upon employment practices in the medium and long term.  To what 
extent do recessions act as a ‘critical juncture’ leading to the transformation of employment practices, 
and if so what might this transformation look like?   One view is that firms might make only short-
term adjustments while largely maintaining the status quo (van Wanrooy et.al, 2013), while others 
note the potential for recessions to modify existing arrangements (Roche and Teague, 2014).  In their 
insightful review of the literature, Roche and Teague (2014) identify three main scenarios.  The first 
suggests that recessions can lead to the diffusion of high commitment approaches and long-term 
oriented investments in HRD and employee engagement.  This perspective seems to be implicit in 
some of the more popular and upbeat HR research (e.g. Ulrich et.al, 2010), and in the UK the 
recession certainly coincided with a decision by the government in 2008 to commission a report 
exploring employee engagement and its potential benefits for companies, employees and UK 
competitiveness (MacLeod and Clarke, 2009).   In contrast, the second view suggests that recessions 
might lead to the diffusion of a ‘new employment deal’, characterised by the increased utilisation of 
contingent labour, a decline in job security and the expansion of precarious employment (Cappelli, 
1999).  Alternatively, any changes might not fit neatly into either of these two scenarios as in practice 
employers might enmesh hard and soft approaches to HRM, as part of a pragmatic approach to HR 
policy rather than one driven by a strong guiding HR philosophy or values (Teague and Roche, 2014).  
The drivers for change may also vary, and while in some cases decisions might be a direct response to 
organisational distress, in others they might be more opportunistic in nature (Geoski and Gregg, 
1997), perhaps as part of an attempt to improve financial performance and deliver greater shareholder 
value  (Appelbaum et.al, 2013; Thompson, 2011). 
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THE RESPONSES OF BRITISH EMPLOYERS TO THE 2008 RECESSION  
In the context of the UK, a national severely affected by the economic crisis, the latest WERS11 
survey of British workplaces provides valuable insights into the responses of employers to the 2008 
recession (van Wanrooy et.al, 2013).  The survey reveals that most employers (75%) made at least 
one employment related response to the challenging economic environment, and those more severely 
affected typically made several changes.  The most common adjustments included freezing and 
cutting pay (41%), freezing recruitment (28%), reorganising work (25%), and postponing expansion 
plans (22%).  Other measures included reducing overtime (19%), and adjustments to training (17%), 
use of agency staff (15%) and working hours (14%).   In terms of cutting employment levels, 10% 
organisations made compulsory redundancies and 7% made voluntary redundancies.  Though 
unemployment rose to 8%, overall employment and unemployment figures levels were remarkably 
resilient given the severity of the economic crisis, and when compared with previous recessions 
(Coulter, 2016; van Wanrooy et.al, 2013). Some 3.5 million workers were made redundant between 
2008 and 2012, equivalent to 1 in 7 employees in work at the start of the recession. However, this is 
comparable with the five years to 2000, a period of more buoyant economic conditions (Philpott, 
2013), and the overall redundancy rate was similar in 2004 and 2011 (ONS, 2013).  Various 
explanations have been offered for the seemingly resilient employment levels (van Wanrooy et.al, 
2013). Economic factors, including several years of strong economic conditions pre-recession, low 
interest rates and a squeeze on real pay might have provided some financial cushioning to firms.  A 
further explanation is that employers might have been eschewing downsizing and hoarding labour 
(Coulter, 2016; van Wanrooy et.al, 2013).  As Coulter (2016) states, “a possibility is that, with 
healthier balance sheets, firms responded to economic difficulty by maintaining their workforce as 
much as possible rather than engaging in short-term cost cutting”.  Relatedly, it is possible employers 
mitigated employment losses by using alternative flexible working arrangements (van Wanrooy et.al, 
2013), and there were certainly reports of major employers including Nissan and Honda implementing 
short time working and temporary layoffs  (Kollwe, 2009).    
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Yet while have insights into the aggregate responses of British employers to the recession at a labour 
market level, we have less insight into exactly how and why particular employers responded as they 
did at the enterprise level, how different adjustments were combined, or the consequences of the 
approach taken.  Were employers favouring alternative flexibility measures to mitigate redundancies 
and protect jobs and if so what form did they take?  Such questions can be difficult to answer from 
large scale quantitative datasets like WERS (van Wanrooy et.al, 2013). Furthermore, to what extent 
did the recession act as a catalyst for the modification of existing labour flexibility practices, perhaps 
as part of an attempt to improve the future resilience of the workplace? Unfortunately, the timing of 
significant British and Irish studies in 2011/12 (Roche et.al, 2013; van Wanrooy et.al, 2013) mean 
they can offer only preliminary insights into the aftermath and legacy of the recession on work and 
employment practices. This may also partly explain why such studies tend to suggest continuity rather 
than change, while analysis of the limited case study evidence available suggests a harsher reality of 
restructuring, job cuts and the imposition of new harder HRM techniques (Cook et.al, 2016; Johnstone 
and Wilkinson, 2017).  In short, our understanding of both the immediate and longer-term 
implications of the recession on employment practices remains limited.  Addressing this gap is the 
motivation for this paper.  
The empirical focus in an automotive parts manufacturer deeply affected by the recession but which, 
like many British employers, did not make large scale redundancies.  In contrast to existing case 
studies which have investigated the implications of recession upon HRM or employment relations 
strategies more broadly (Cook et.al, 2016; Johnstone and Wilkinson, 2017; Roche and Teague, 2014), 
the primary focus is upon exploring the ‘flexible labour model’ espoused by the employer, and 
believed to be central to the organisations ability to manage through turbulent times. Two main 
themes guided the empirical inquiry:  
(1) How and why did the organisation use labour flexibility strategies to navigate recession, and 
what were the consequences of the approach taken?    
(2) What was the legacy of the recession and were existing labour flexibility strategies modified 
or transformed post-recession?   
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The paper makes several contributions.  Empirically, it provides rare insights at the enterprise level 
into how an organisation heavily affected by the economic downturn navigated the recession.  Such 
issues have received limited attention in the existing literature (Teague and Roche, 2014).  A 
qualitative case study approach allowed the study to probe how and why particular labour flexibility 
strategies were implemented, as well as how they were combined and perceived by actors.  The 
timing of the fieldwork in the period 2014/15, though not longitudinal, allowed analysis of how the 
crisis unfolded over a period of years during both crisis and recovery. It therefore offers valuable 
insights into the legacy of the recession.  A further strength is inclusion of worker perspectives which 
is much-needed in HRM research. Conceptually, the study contributes to ongoing debates in this 
journal and elsewhere regarding employment practices in turbulent times, (Ahlstrand, 2015; Larsen 
and Navjberg, 2015; Roche et.al, 2015; Svalund, 2015), as well as broader debates regarding labour 
flexibility and the impact of economic cycles on employment (Dekker and van der Veen, 2015; 
Preenen et.al, 2015; Roche and Teague, 2014; Teague and Roche, 2014). The remainder of the article 
is structured as followed.  The next sections present the conceptual background and research methods.  
We then present a case study of automotive parts manufacturer – referred to by the pseudonym 
AutoParts – to the Great Recession of 2008.   We then discuss the findings and implications before 
drawing some conclusions.   
RECESSIONS AND LABOUR FLEXIBLITY 
The ability of an organisation to respond a sudden shock, such as a recession, can be thought of as a 
test of flexibility, defined by Meulders and Wilkin (1987) as “the capacity to adjust to change”.  In 
much mainstream management research flexibility is viewed as a virtue associated with successful 
organisations (Blyton, 1996; Legge, 1995).  Our key concern is labour flexibility, and such concerns 
have a long history as the use of overtime and casual workers confirms (Blyton, 1996);  arguably the 
notion of more stable employment arrangements with a single employer only emerged around the 
time of industrialisation (Cappelli, 1999).  In recent decades, academic discussions of labour 
flexibility have been influenced by the ‘flexible firm’ model proposed by Atkinson and colleagues in 
the 1980s (Atkinson, 1984; Atkinson and Meager, 1986).  In simple terms, the model suggested that 
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labour flexibility can be achieved by segmenting a ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ workforce.  Core 
employees are those with valuable firm-specific skills and are viewed as assets to be developed and 
retained.  They will be offered good pay, training, career development opportunities and employment 
security.  In return, these workers will be multi-skilled and must be flexible in the tasks they carry out 
(functional flexibility).  The core is encircled by ‘peripheral’ workers with more generic skills and 
who have more limited employment security.  These workers provide organisations with the 
opportunity to adjust the number of employees to match their requirements (numerical flexibility).  In 
times of low demand then, we might expect the redeployment of core workers to other tasks and the 
disposal of peripheral workers.   
However, the Atkinson ‘flexible firm model’ has been widely criticised (Hyman, 1991; Pollert, 1991; 
Procter et.al, 1994).  It was also unclear whether Atkinson was trying to describe, predict or prescribe 
a model of a ‘flexible firm’ (Marchington et.al, 2016).  The generic nature of the model means it does 
not consider potentially important contextual factors such as management strategy, work organisation, 
production techniques or the drivers for labour flexibility. One motivation for flexibility is to allow 
firms to adapt to temporary changes in demand, also known as ‘capacity flexibility’ (Håkansson and 
Isidorsson, 2003).  Håkansson and Isidorsson suggest that in manufacturing contexts, there have been 
important developments in production operations such as the shift towards lean production which 
aims to minimise inventory, buffers and stock.  They argue that this approach leaves manufacturers 
highly exposed to fluctuations in demand, and that the ability to adjust production volume often 
requires flexible labour. Building upon Atkinson (1984), they propose three main forms of flexibility: 
numerical; working time and functional flexibility (See Table 1).  In times of high demand, a firm 
may hire more workers on a temporary or permanent basis depending upon the anticipated duration of 
increased demand (numerical flexibility).  They may also increase the hours for workers (working 
time flexibility) or reorganise roles to help meet production demand (functional flexibility).  
Conversely, in times of low demand, firms may reduce the size of their workforce temporarily or 
permanently (numerical flexibility), reduce working hours (working time flexibility), or reallocate 
staff to different roles (functional flexibility). The approach taken is likely to depend upon context. 
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Numerical flexibility is perhaps more appropriate where jobs require only a short job introduction, 
while the feasibility of working time variations may depend upon job design.  Functional flexibility 
might require different demand patterns to be feasible.  In terms of consequences, flexibility strategies 
allow firms to rationalise production, reduce slack, and manage peaks and troughs in demand.  For 
workers, however, the removal of slack might mean work intensification, and potentially also the 
segmentation of the workforce into different groups with different employment arrangements.   We 
use this framework to guide our assessment of labour flexibility strategies at the enterprise level in the 
context of AutoParts. a manufacturing organisation which espoused a flexible labour model, and 
suggest that this was central to its ability to managing during economic turbulence.   
 [INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]   
  
RESEARCH METHODS  
Existing quantitative studies of recessionary adjustments provide valuable cross-sectional insights into 
measures at a labour market level (van Wanrooy et.al, 2013). However, this study is concerned with 
exploring how and why organisations responded to recession as they did, and how practices evolved 
as economic conditions improved. A qualitative case study design was thus deemed most appropriate 
in helping understand the dynamics of flexibility strategies at the enterprise level and in a particular 
organisational context (Bryman and Bell 2007; Yin, 2013). As Sengupta and Edwards (2010) note, “a 
particular strength of such approaches is that they facilitate a more rounded consideration of espoused 
policies and practices than can be achieved by relying upon one-off employer statements.  It also 
provides an opportunity to explore the specific ‘meaning’ of employment practices, given the 
reporting of practices might reveal very little about how they are enacted or perceived (Cook et.al, 
2016).   
In selecting a suitable case a degree of ‘purposeful sampling’ was employed, and the empirical focus 
is AutoParts, a manufacturer of components for the commercial vehicle industry. The British 
manufacturing sector was heavily affected by the 2008 recession, with around half of manufacturing 
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organisations reporting a ‘significant’ impact on business while a quarter described a ‘moderate’ 
impact (van Wanrooy et.al, 2013).   At AutoParts the effect of the recession was described by senior 
managers as “sudden and deep”.   However, it was also suggested that as a private sector employer 
operating in volatile automotive markets established flexibility strategies were already in place, and 
the challenging economic conditions can be viewed as an important test of these measures. The study 
draws upon numerous site visits, meetings and formal interviews conducted during the period 2014-
2016, with a focus upon shopfloor production arrangements. The timing of the research meant that as 
well as insights on the specific adjustment measures adopted in late 2008, we obtained views on how 
developments had unfolded over time, and as the organisation recovered and subsequently grown.  
The study draws primarily upon insights from eighteen in-depth interviews.  The aim was to obtain 
the perspectives of different actors, and interviewees included senior managers, line managers, 
employee representatives and front-line production employees.  Management respondents included 
the Group HR Director, former Group HR Director, HR Manager, Site Manager, former Site 
Manager, Operations Manager and Production Manager.  Given that some people in key management 
positions in 2014 were not in the same position in 2008, access to their predecessor was also generally 
possible and allowed comparisons in perspectives to be drawn.  Other interviewees comprised 
supervisors, production operatives and members of the in-house Staff Council (AutoParts is a non-
union organisation). The duration of interviews ranged from one to two hours, and several 
respondents offered to answer any further questions after the interview by email or telephone.  
Questions concerned changing business conditions, and the nature of employment practices and 
approaches to labour flexibility.  Interviews also aimed to obtain insights regarding employment 
arrangements prior to the recession, the use of labour flexibility strategies during the downturn, as 
well as how these have evolved since the recession.  All interviews were recorded and transcribed to 
facilitate thematic analysis, and subsequently coded using categories which guided the design of the 
interview template as well as emergent and recurring themes raised by interviewees themselves 
(Lofland and Lofland, 1995.  Insights obtained during formal interviews were supplemented by 
informal interactions over lunch and coffee, and enabled the researcher to obtain clarification on 
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issues.  There was also an opportunity to have a tour of the production facility and meet operatives 
and this was valuable in understanding production operations. Access has also been provided to 
relevant internal documentation including policy documents, presentation slides and HR data during 
the period under study. These allowed contextualisation and triangulation of interview findings and to 
mitigate the risks of poor recall.   In contrast to snapshot studies, contact with the organisational 
gatekeeper and management team has been ongoing for several years as part of a broader research 
engagement. This has provided various informal and formal opportunities to check issues of 
interpretation.  As with much case study research, the findings may be deemed context specific, 
though creating statistically generalisable findings was not the motivation for the study. Rather, the 
aim was to obtain go beyond reports of labour flexibility practices and to obtain richer insights into 
how practices are implemented as well as how they evolve. Nevertheless, a degree of ‘analytical 
generalisation’ may be possible (Yin, 2013). 
 FINDINGS 
Context  
AutoParts designs and manufactures automotive components for heavy duty commercial vehicles, and 
their main customers are the manufacturers and users of trucks, buses and agricultural equipment.  
The focus of this study is the main European production site located in Northern England.  Since 
production began at the site in the mid-1990s, the overall trajectory has been one of significant growth 
across various metrics including production, sales and employment levels.  Around 250 people work 
at the facility in both production and office based roles, and as a non-union organisation employee 
representation is provided through an internal Staff Council.   Production activity involves the 
assembly of patented automotive components and comprises two business streams.  First are ‘New 
Build’ components, supplied to original equipment manufacturers to be installed in new commercial 
vehicles.  These components are assembled in production cells comprising small teams of operatives. 
Each cell can accommodate between one and five operatives depending on demand.  Demand for new 
components is highly cyclical with low demand over summer during the European holiday season, 
and very sensitive to conditions in automotive markets.  Second are ‘Aftermarket’ components which 
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produce replacement components throughout the life of vehicles, and which need to be replaced at 
regular intervals. Aftermarket parts are assembled on a production line and the number of operatives 
required to operate the line at any one time is fixed.  Demand for aftermarket parts is generally more 
stable and less sensitive to the vagaries of market conditions.   Production roles in both business 
streams can be learnt relatively quickly though it can take several months to become as efficient as an 
experienced operator.  Traditionally, the production workforce has comprised permanent AutoParts 
employees on open-ended contracts, and a ‘buffer’ of staff provided by an employment agency, a 
model believed to be typical in the automotive industry given variable market conditions.   
The impact of the recession in 2008  
Prior to the recession, the financial performance of the business had been strong for several years, and 
the site had repeatedly expanded in terms of production output and staffing numbers.  Additional 
production cells and lines had been introduced coupled with investment in new technology.  By 2007 
production output had reached record levels, and forecasts suggested that this upward trajectory 
would continue in 2008.  A senior manager recalled how the challenges experienced by some 
European and US financial organisations in the second half of 2007 had created a stir in the media and 
in business circles, but that the order book was strong and sales remained steady. Some “softening of 
demand” was reported during summer 2008, but as most European automotive manufacturers have a 
summer shutdown, it was believed to reflect the usual summer lull rather than a more fundamental 
change in market conditions.  By autumn, increased uncertainty and talk of the ‘credit crunch’ in 
financial markets raised the spectre of a downturn, though the mood was still confident.    As a Senior 
Manager recalled: 
“I was in a meeting in mid-September 2008, and while we had seen demand fall over the summer we 
were still okay, doing reasonably well, people were still pretty confident.  And I remember it was 
during that meeting that someone announced that Lehman Brothers had just gone bust.  And then I 
was concerned.  Really concerned. Were we about to fall off a cliff?  And I think it was within 30 
days or so after that happening that it was quite literally a crash” (Senior Manager).        
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The Operations Manager noted how in October 2008: 
“I was in my office and someone came in and asked if our systems were down as orders had 
disappeared.  And when we investigated several orders had been cancelled and many others 
postponed until the following year.  And by December we didn’t know where the next order was 
coming from.  You’d have someone like TruckCo normally making 20,000 engines a month.  Well in 
November 2008 they sold 72 trucks, and we’re their main supplier.  They didn’t want anything at all 
from us. They had some inventory.  People simply stopped buying new trucks and we basically lost 
our New Build business. All businesses go into survival mode, no one is buying anything from 
anyone.  I thought how are we going to manage through this, a crash unlike anything we’ve seen 
before?” (Operations Manager).    
While demand for New Build components suddenly vanished, demand for Aftermarket parts is 
generally more resilient and could provide some level of cushioning during a downturn.  As the HR 
Manager explained: 
“Thankfully a chunk of our profit comes from the Aftermarket and they’re patented products.  When 
you get a service one of our parts will be put in.  And regardless of a recession you’re not going to 
ruin a fleet of £120,000 trucks by not get them serviced.  So, our Aftermarket businesses does fare a 
bit better in recessions” (HR Manager).  
By the end of 2008, and following many years of consistent growth and expansion, production output 
had fallen by 50%.  While demand for New Build products had disappeared, orders for Aftermarket 
parts meant production did not come to a complete halt.   
 
 
 
Company labour flexibility strategies in recession   
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A Shift Manager explained that a workforce meeting was convened in early October 2008 to 
communicate the changing context with employees:   
“They called a big meeting and everyone was there.  They said, right, orders have nosedived and we 
need to make savings, and unfortunately the savings will mean resources.  When they say ‘resources’, 
you know they usually mean people. I really don’t like that.  I’m a not a resource, I’m a person and 
my team are not resources, they’re people and any decisions affect their livelihood” (Shift Manager).  
The first measure announced was that all agency staff would be “released” from the business.  This 
was to have a significant impact on the size of the workforce as around one third of the production 
workforce were employed by an external employment agency.  As the business had grown rapidly in 
the years preceding the recession, many new workers were supplied by a local employment agency 
and agency workers had become common in the areas of production most sensitive to changes in 
production demand (notably Goods In, New Build, Dispatch).  This was believed to be essential 
because of the “feast and famine” nature of the New Build business which has short and unpredictable 
order books.  Indeed, even in a year of record output in New Build, it was said that this would 
typically comprise a mix of quiet months, such as summer, as well as more unpredictable periods 
where the business struggled to meet a surge in demand.   Developing a buffer of “structural temps” 
was believed to be a way of managing these “spiky demand patterns” in the areas most sensitive to 
changing production levels, allowing the business to temporarily increase and decrease the production 
workforce when necessary.  At peak times overtime would also be plentiful.  Some agency workers 
managed to secure permanent AutoParts contracts, while others had become many “long-term 
agency”, working on and off with AutoParts for some time.    
However, when the crisis hit in late 2008: 
“The tough reality was that we needed to shed all the temps.  Its’ like an insurance policy I guess.  
Yes, we pay an upfront premium for temps, and many work here a while when things are steady. 
Some might say why not just take them on then, give them a permanent contract?  But we can let 
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agency workers go in an inexpensive and swift manner if and when a downturn comes.  And in this 
case that was absolutely the first thing we had to do” (Senior Manager). 
As the HR Manager explained:  
“To be honest we had way too many temps [when demand fell].  They were sweeping the floor.  
Cleaning. I sat down with every single temp and explained what was happening, that we were sorry to 
let them go, and that we’d love to have them back.  Some had been here a long time.  But I shared the 
analytics with them, we weren’t trying dupe anyone, told them where we were coming from.  We 
explained we’d bring them back as soon as we could” (HR Manager).      
Having quickly reduced the size of the production workforce by removing all agency workers, the 
business also reduced the number of shifts from three to one meaning that all workers would now 
work a standard working week. A consequence of the reduction in shifts was that all production 
employees would no longer be entitled to the shift premia associated with alternating shift patterns.  
Coupled with the elimination of overtime opportunities it was suggested by an Employee 
Representative that some workers viewed the changes as “a pay cut but most folk took solace in the 
fact they were still here, they had seen folk go, they were watching the news and knew that these were 
really bad times”.   
Most New Build workers were redeployed to help with Aftermarket production. Though some 
employees were officially ‘multi-skilled’, moving between these two areas was not normal practice 
and it was suggested that redeployed workers had to learn the skills required to work on the 
Aftermarket production line.     Managers explained that while these steps allowed the business to 
reduce costs, as the recession continued to bite further cost saving measures were deemed necessary.  
Various options were mooted including pay cuts and short-time working. Interestingly, a decision was 
made to implement short-time working/pay cut for the senior leadership team only.  As a senior 
manager explained:    
“It was called officially called short-time working, a four-day week for the leadership team. In reality 
it was actually a form of salary sacrifice, a pay cut, because most of the senior leaders still worked 5 
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and 6 days a week to try and keep the place afloat.  Of course, a 20% cut of leadership pay is going to 
do very little to the bottom line.  But it was more than that.  It was symbolic.  It allowed us to say, you 
know, we’re all in this together.  We might be management but we’re suffering too and will share the 
pain” (Senior Manager). 
However short time working and pay cuts were rejected for the production operators, and instead 
some voluntary redundancies were offered.  As the HR Manager explained:     
“We crunched the numbers again and worked out that we still needed to lose people.  Now you can’t 
always avoid compulsory redundancies but there was a deliberate move to avoid compulsory 
redundancies by any means necessary.  People were able to enquire about what their package might 
be, no questions asked.  Our view was that we should try and let the people who want to leave go, 
rather than focusing on the role they were doing.  And to be honest if that meant long nights 
brainstorming how to sort things out then so be it” (HR Manager). 
Following extremely tough trading conditions during autumn and winter 2008/9, by Spring 2009, 
some early signs of recovery were reported in New Build. This was followed by a sudden surge for 
parts in the Aftermarket business, which was believed to reflect that as vehicle users had delayed or 
postponed upgrading their fleets, there were now many more older vehicles in use.   As the Operations 
Manager explained:   
“The orders suddenly flooded in and we quickly had a massive backlog of orders in Aftermarket. It 
annoyed the hell out of our customers and we had to do something. We put overtime on but it wasn’t 
enough.  We desperately needed extra shifts and extra shifts need more people.  So we had no choice. 
We rang the agency and put extra shifts back on. But it was a really strange position as at that point 
the leadership team were still taking their pay cut, and the corporate line was still about short-time 
working, not using agencies, no overtime.  We’d literally gone from dire straits to being short 
staffed!” (Operations Manager).   
The impact of the recession at AutoParts was described as “deep and quick” with a significant fall in 
demand during 2008 and 2009.  Aftermarket proved more resilient and cushioned the blow at the 
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height of the downturn, while recovery in New Build was more gradual.  By 2011 conditions in both 
business streams had improved, and the company organised an end of year celebration to mark the 
recovery.  Since this period the business has continued to grow. For the company, the flexibility 
strategy was generally viewed as successful as it allowed the business to expand and contract 
relatively easily in line with changing market conditions, and to protect the employment of a ‘core’ 
workforce.     
Company labour flexibility strategies during recovery  
Yet despite broadly sanguine assessments of the way the business navigated the recession, and the 
ability adjust staffing to match production levels, it was nevertheless suggested by a senior business 
leader that:  
“Following the recession, we realised we’d really felt our way through and we really need to look at 
things differently going forward.  I think it was a wakeup call for a number of people.  There’s a lot of 
volatility out there.  This was not a one off.  We had also suffered back in 2001.  As a listed company 
on the stock exchange we report quarterly and we need to be able to manage the expectations of the 
investment community.  We must be very results focused.  We need to make sure we have the right 
processes in place” (Senior Manager).  
Since the crisis several changes in labour flexibility strategies were described in relation to staffing 
policies, workforce composition and labour utilisation.       
First, it was suggested that prior to the recession staffing levels were primarily a matter for line 
managers to decide locally, based upon production forecasts, past experience and their own 
judgement.  Since the recession it was suggested that obtaining additional staff is a more onerous 
process requiring new paperwork and various management approvals.  Besides, a new IT system 
means the number of operatives required on a day to day basis is automatically determined by a 
computer program.  As a Shift Manager explained: 
“In the past you could just ring up the agency, I want ten more people.  Now you have to plan all your 
work, you feed into an Excel spreadsheet, and it tells you straightaway how many people you need.  
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Before it was much more rough cut. Based on historical data  or just how you’d always done it.  But 
maybe not the best in terms of managing costs.  We didn’t really have a handle in that in 2008. It’s 
much more data driven now.  Some says it’s dumbing down, but it’s all about controlling our costs” 
(Shift Manager).     
Second, there have been noticeable changes in the composition of the production workforce.  Prior to 
the recession, the production workforce was segmented between permanent staff and a buffer of 
‘stable temps’ employed by an agency who worked in the areas mostly closely affected by variable 
demand such as New Build.  They would typically account for up to one third of the production 
workforce at any one time.  However, since the recession there has been an increase in the utilisation 
of agency workers across the production floor.  As the HR Manager explained: 
“As people have left the business, we’ve generally replaced them with an agency temp, not a 
permanent person.  We still do periodic temp to perm conversions but it’s not a high number.  We 
need the right degree of flex and I’d say that’s pretty much been the last seven or so years since the 
recession.  From a business perspective it’s absolutely the thing to do” (HR Manager).  
While prior to the recession most agency staff were located in parts of the business which experienced 
peaks and troughs in demand, concerns were expressed by line managers and operatives regarding the 
new “agency culture” on the factory floor.  Respondents suggested that the use of agency workers 
may be deemed sensible in areas with volatile demand patterns, and where the work is generally team 
based and the size of the team can be adjusted to match production. However, questions were raised 
regarding the utilisation of agency workers in parts of production with steady and predictable staffing 
requirements.  As a production operative explained: 
“I think we do need to use temporary staff, but I think if it’s on the production line in Aftermarket, to 
operate a shift at all you know you need X number of people to run.  It’s a fixed number. Quite 
predictable. Shouldn’t these then be permanent positions?  You can’t run the lines if these people 
aren’t here.  If a minimum number of people are needed for the line to run I think they should be 
permanent” (Production Operative).  
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As well as the increase in the proportion of agency workers and their diffusion across the shopfloor, 
there was also a notable change in how some new agency workers are now utilised.   As a production 
operative explained: 
“We used to have two groups of worker but now we have three.  There are those with permanent 
contracts.  Then you’ve got your ‘permanent agency’ if you like, everyone knows them, they’ve been 
here for years, very skilled.  Then you’ve got your ‘temporary agency’ who just come in and out.  
Now none of this officially exists by the way, but it’s how we see it on the shopfloor.  So if they want 
to make cuts, all those that’ve been here a month, bye!  And they will try and keep the ‘permanent 
agency’ who’ve maybe been here three or four years and are really experienced with the machines.  
To be honest they can now cherry pick who goes and when and the last to go would be the most 
valued” (Production Operative).    
The HR Manager acknowledged that since the recession, in addition to a group of “stable temps” are a 
pool of ad hoc agency workers.  As she explained:  
“This new flexible model means I can switch labour on and off with minimal notice.  If we need a 
temp I can get one the next day because the agency have the type of people we need on their books.  
Some have already done our basic induction, done some shifts before, and can slot right in whenever 
we want.  We have flexibility on a daily, even hourly basis now; we can even send these people home 
if there is no work” (HR Manager). 
This can be contrasted with the dominant model prior to the recession when agency workers generally 
had stable and regular employment, except during occasional quieter months when they might have 
been laid off for several weeks. However, as a Senior Manager explained: 
“It’s no longer just about the ability to lay them off for a month in the summer if you like, it’s actually 
flexing during the months and weeks as we operate, and looking more and more about how we can get 
much leaner business processes, much more robust in how we work.  We really need that extra 
flexibility within the business” (Senior Manager).  
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However, the new approach was widely questioned by line managers and employees as the following 
remark illustrates: 
“One week they’re in and the next week they’re not.  It’s really difficult as a temp.  You’re wondering 
when your next work is coming.  It must be difficult to run your life like that.  Folk get upset if 
they’re not on the rota, so I try and rotate them so they all get some work and keep their skills up.  But 
to be told you are not needed today or sent home after two hours because there are no parts.  It may be 
a sound business strategy but it’s definitely not nice to people.  You could even say it’s selfish of the 
business.  To be honest I’ve never thought of it like that before” (Shift Manager). 
However, has the HR Manager concluded: 
“It’s simply something we need to do in this kind of business and at the end of the day it means we 
can protect our business and the permanent workforce going forward.  The stuff we have to do from a 
business perspective can be hard” (HR Manager).   
DISCUSSION  
How and why did the organisation use labour flexibility strategies to navigate recession and what 
were the consequences of the approach taken? 
Håkansson and Isidorsson (2003) suggest that while there are various potential drivers for labour 
flexibility, in manufacturing a major motivation is adjusting production levels to meet variable 
demand, especially as modern manufacturing techniques emphasise lean approaches which minimise 
inventory and stock.  Labour flexibility is therefore important, and they suggest this can take three 
main forms (numerical, functional and working time), and that the preferred approach is likely to 
depend upon context and can have very different consequences.  Our first objective was therefore to 
explore how employers responded to recession at the enterprise level.  We use this typology to assess 
how AutoParts, a firm severely affected by recession, utilised labour flexibility strategies to navigate 
the crisis.   
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The study reveals how prior to the recession the business had emphasised the development of 
numerical flexibility by utilising agency workers in some of the most cyclical areas of production.  
However, many years of strong trading conditions resulted in the development of a relatively stable 
agency workforce with regular employment, but also enabling the business to occasionally reduce the 
number of staff in quieter months.  Even when market conditions were strong and the business was 
expanding, there was an emphasis upon maintaining a level of potential numerical flexibility in case 
of a downturn, helping to reduce slack and protect the ‘core’ workforce.  This reflects the notion of 
‘stable flexibility’ (Håkansson et.al, 2013), whereby ‘temporary’ agency staff are increasingly used as 
part of a long-term labour management strategy rather than simply a reaction to an immediate need 
resulting in a cadre of long-term agency workers (Holst et.al, 2010; Voss et.al, 2013).  The workforce 
was therefore segmented between a ‘core’ on permanent contracts and a ‘periphery’ of (relatively 
stable) agency workers, some with quasi-permanent status.  The benefit for the business compared to 
a hire and fire model was that it allowed temporary adjustments to be made without the permanence 
and distress of downsizing, and this was deemed preferable in managing volatile automotive markets.  
While in some ways this may reflect the segmentation approach proposed by Atkinson (1984), in 
stable conditions the core/periphery distinction was blurred, and both groups worked together and 
carried out the same tasks.    There was also little evidence of functional flexibility, while working 
time flexibility measures were only used in times of very high demand (by regularly offering 
overtime) rather than when demand fell.  
This emphasis on numerical flexibility meant that when the business experienced a sudden fall in 
demand in late 2008, it could quickly and easily reduce the size of the workforce by removing all 
agency staff.  However, because the impact on the two main business streams differed, there was an 
opportunity to redistribute remaining production workers who were therefore required to be 
functionally flexible.  Working time adjustments were also made, including an overtime ban and the 
temporary implementation of a single shift standard working week.  Compulsory short-time working 
was avoided, presumably because the standard working week already meant a loss of shift pay for 
production workers despite working the same number of hours.   Instead, when further cost savings 
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were sought the business offered a small number of voluntary redundancies (numerical flexibility) 
rather than imposing a reduction in working time (working time flexibility). The case thus reveals 
how the business navigated the recession by deploying a combination of numerical, functional and 
working time flexibility measures to achieve cost savings.  For the employer, this was viewed as a 
successful illustration the flexible labour model, and the approach taken was believed to have 
protected the business and ‘core’ employees, and allowed the business to quickly and easily make cost 
savings and mitigated the need for large scale redundancies.  It also allowed AutoParts to quickly 
increase production when conditions improved by sourcing more staff from the agency (numerical 
flexibility) and offering overtime (working time flexibility).  For workers, the implications are less 
clear cut.  Most permanent staff remained in employment in exchange for a willingness to carry out 
other roles (functional flexibility) and accept changes to schedules which also meant a temporary 
reduction in pay (working time flexibility).  Agency workers carried most of the risk, and were laid 
off.  In times of crisis then, in some ways this reflects a core/periphery approach with agency staff 
providing numerical flexibility and permanent staff accepting functional and working time flexibility 
in exchange for greater job security (Atkinson, 1984). Yet while agency staff had less security, most 
of the time the core/periphery border was blurred (Hakansson et.al, 2013), and as the case reveals, 
permanent workers did not have complete immunity from redundancies when further cost savings 
were sought.  A summary of the developments is provided in Table 2. 
[Table 2 about here]  
Were existing labour flexibility strategies modified or transformed post-recession? 
As well as how firms use labour flexibility strategies to navigate changing conditions are further 
important questions regarding the medium and long-term implications for employment practices.  To 
what extent do recessions act as a ‘critical juncture’ leading to the transformation of employment 
practices, and what might such transformation look like (Roche and Teague, 2014). Some of the 
popular and upbeat HR research suggests that recessions might lead to the diffusion of high 
commitment management and long-term investments in HRD and employee engagement (e.g. Ulrich 
et.al, 2009), and in the UK the economic crisis coincided with a surge of interest in raising levels of 
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employee engagement and a government commissioned report on the topic (MacLeod and Clarke, 
2009).  In direct contrast, others see the potential for recessions to act as a catalyst for a ‘new 
employment deal’ involving the increased utilisation of more contingent labour, a decline in job 
security and the spread of more precarious forms of employment (Cappelli, 1999).  Somewhere in 
between these two extremes is the suggestion that any changes might not fit neatly into either of these 
pure scenarios, as employers adopt a more ‘pick and mix’ approach enmeshing elements of soft and 
hard HRM practice, or that firms might make only short-term adjustments while largely maintaining 
the status quo (Roche and Teague, 2014.    Recent labour market evidence in both the UK and Ireland 
certainly lends some empirical support to this more variegated picture (Roche et.al, 2013; Roche and 
Teague, 2014; van Wanrooy et.al, 2013).  However, there are at least two limitations of such studies.  
First, the timing of these national level labour studies and their cross-sectional nature means they can 
only provide partial insight into the legacy of the recession on employment practices.  A further 
possibility, informed by the flexibility literature (Atkinson, 1984; Håkansson and Isidorsson, 2003), is 
that employers might be adopting more segmented approaches with the impact depending which 
group of employees are being considered.  Our second objective was therefore to assess the legacy of 
the recession at AutoParts, and to explore whether labour flexibility practices were transformed post-
recession. 
The case reveals how the recession acted as a significant test of the labour flexibility at AutoParts, and 
as a catalyst to review labour flexibility strategies for the future.  The outcome of this management 
review was the view that while the existing strategy was appropriate, more must be done to manage 
during future periods of volatility more effectively.  As a result, at least three important changes could 
be observed post-recession.  First, there has been an emphasis upon increasing the level of numerical 
flexibility, and in practice this has involved increasing the use of agency staff in production roles. 
Prior to the recession agency staff were used in areas most sensitive to variable demand, while most 
workers in more predictable areas were permanent employees.  Since the recession, agency workers 
are now used across production and there are far fewer ‘core’ workers.  Second, staffing levels are 
now more strictly controlled and monitored.  Before the recession, line managers had discretion over 
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staffing levels; now a computer system automatically determines ‘optimum’ staffing levels based 
which meet key cost/sales metrics.  Thirdly, there has also been a change in the way agency staff are 
used.  Prior to the recession, there was an identifiable ‘core’ on permanent contracts, and a periphery 
of agency workers offered relatively stable work, and the prospect of converting from ‘stable temp’ to 
permanent employee. Since the recession, however, a new group of workers have emerged and are 
used to offer numerical and working time flexibility on a weekly, daily and even hourly basis.  While 
this model might help the employer further minimise slack and reduce costs the implications for 
workers are less positive.  Rather, the post-recession employment model comprises a shrinking core 
of permanent employees, a group of ‘stable temps’ with few prospects of obtaining a permanent 
contract, and a new group of ‘temporary temps’ with high levels of uncertainty regarding when they 
will work or whether will work at all.  A summary of developments is provided in Table 2.  
CONCLUSION 
A key finding of the research examining the impact of the 2008 recession on employment in Britain is 
that the impact on employment levels was less severe than we might have expected given the severity 
of the crisis and compared with previous recessions.  One explanation is that employers used 
alternative flexibility measures to mitigate redundancies (van Wanrooy et.al, 2013).  However, there 
are few studies which investigate how employers navigated the recession at the enterprise level, or the 
consequences of the approach taken.  Our first objective was therefore to shed much needed empirical 
light on this issue through an in-depth study of labour flexibility strategies at AutoParts, a 
manufacturing organisations heavily affected by recession, but which did not make large scale 
redundancies.  It reveals how in this case, redundancies were mitigated primarily because the 
organisation had a numerically flexible workforce predicated upon the use of agency workers. 
Production staff were segmented between core workers on open ended permanent contracts, and a 
sizeable contingent of agency workers with stable employment in buoyant conditions, but who could 
be released easily in a downturn.  When the crisis hit, the firm could quickly reduce the size of the 
workforce without the need to make mass redundancies (numerical flexibility).  Changes were then 
made to the job roles and working schedules of remaining permanent staff (functional and working 
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time flexibility).  Thus, while the organisation avoided making large scale redundancies, this was not 
because of a commitment to an ‘employment stabilisation’ or ‘responsible restructuring’ HR 
philosophy (Cascio, 2005; 2010; Teague and Roche, 2014); neither was it because the business 
hoarded labour or utilised working time flexibility measures to protect employment (Coulter, 2016; 
Teague and Roche, 2014; van Wanrooy et.al, 2013).  Rather, it reflected a pre-existing flexibility 
model which prioritised numerical flexibility through agency workers to enable the firm to adapt to 
temporary changes in demand, and enabled the business to adjust the size of the workforce at will. 
However, as well as how and why organisations respond as they do during challenging times, are 
further important questions regarding the impact on employment practices in the medium and long 
term (Roche and Teague, 2014).  Our second objective was therefore to assess whether the recession 
acted as a ‘critical juncture’ leading to the transformation of employment practices after the 
challenges of the economic crisis receded, and specifically whether the recession acted as a catalyst 
for the modification of existing labour flexibility arrangements.  We reveal how following the 
recession, and as the organisation recovered and subsequently expanded, the emphasis has been upon 
further increasing numerical flexibility. In addition to ‘stable agency’ workers with ongoing regular 
employment are a new group of ad hoc agency workers who provide both numerical and working 
time flexibility.  In other words, there has been both a diffusion and more intense utilisation of more 
market-led employment contracts, and a shrinking core of workers on standard employment contracts 
since the recession (Cappelli, 1999).  In practice, the production workforce has been segmented into 
three groups with different levels of certainty regarding when they will work, how long they will work 
for, or whether will work at all.  
Importantly, this has been a proactive business decision, viewed by the employer as an opportunity to 
further enhance efficiency and financial performance rather than as a response to challenging 
economic conditions (Appelbaum et.al, 2013; Geoski and Gregg, 1997; Thompson, 2011; Thompson, 
2013).  Thus, while large scale quantitative studies at a labour market level in the UK and Ireland 
suggested continuity rather than change in employment practices (Roche et.al, 2013; van Wanrooy 
et.al, 2013), in our case organisation there was clear evidence post-recession of a shift towards a more 
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market-led employment model driven by short financial imperatives (Cappelli, 1999; Thompson, 
2011).  Perhaps the timing of the fieldwork of quantitative labour market studies in 2011/12 meant 
they offered only offer partial and preliminary insights into the full aftermath of the recession.  
Indeed, recent case study evidence suggests the impact on work has been more profound, and that in 
many cases the reality has been restructuring, work intensification, job enlargement and the 
imposition of harder HRM techniques.  Interestingly, the evidence suggests that this is not just the 
case in sectors hardest hit by the crisis such as financial services (Gall, 2017), but also true in 
organisations more mildly affected by recession even in firms hitherto known from commitment-
oriented HRM (Cook et.al, 2016; Johnstone and Wilkinson, 2017).  It is therefore possible that the 
uncertain economic and labour market conditions since the recession have given employers the 
opportunity to capitalise upon diminished labour market power to implement more hard-line HRM 
practices to improve firm level and financial performance metrics (Cook et.al, 2016; Thompson, 
2011).  In line with the disconnect capitalism thesis (Thompson, 2003), it might be the case that even 
generally well-intentioned managers and employers find themselves under intense pressure to 
improve financial metrics.  The shift towards a more market-led employment model, viewed in our 
case a way to boost productivity, is one example of this.  Nevertheless, it is difficult to generalise 
from the experience of a single case and further studies are required to ascertain the extent to which 
the developments in our organisations might reflect a broader pattern.  There is thus significant scope 
for further studies at the labour market and enterprise level to further our understanding of the impact 
and legacy of the recession on work and employment practices in post-financial crisis Britain.   
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TABLE 1: Pre-requisites and consequences of different strategies 
Adapted from Håkansson and Isidorsson (2003) 
 Numerical (flexibility 
in the number of 
employees) 
Working time 
(flexibility in working 
hours) 
Functional (flexibility 
in work organisation) 
Requires Short job introduction Variety or enriched 
work tasks means 
extending working 
hours is easier  
Different patterns of 
demand for products 
and services 
For individuals  Increased work 
intensity 
Uncertainty for temps 
re work 
Risk of long term 
insecurity  
  
Increased work 
intensity 
Uncertainty as to when 
and how long 
employees will work  
Increased work 
intensity 
Uncertainty as to 
where employee will 
work or what they will 
work with  
For workplace  Rationalisation of 
production 
Segmentation into 
core/periphery OR 
stagnation in work 
development 
Rationalisation of 
production 
Less turnover 
Stable workforce  
Rationalisation of 
production  
Less turnover 
Stable workforce  
Emphasis on 
competence 
development. 
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TABLE 2: Company labour flexibility strategies at AutoParts (2008-2014) 
 Numerical  
(Flexibility in the 
Number of 
Employees) 
Working time 
(Flexibility in 
working hours) 
Functional 
(Flexibility in 
work organisation) 
Consequences 
for business 
Consequences 
for workers  
 
Pre-recession 
(-2008) 
Agency staff in 
most cyclical areas 
but with regular 
and generally 
stable work. Most 
highly experienced. 
Allow organisation 
to flex down during 
quiet months by 
temporarily laying 
off agency staff 
(e.g. summer) and 
to flex up in times 
of high demand.  
‘Stable flexibility’  
Overtime 
(extended hours or 
extra shifts) 
regularly offered 
to all staff during 
busy periods.   
Limited functional 
flexibility.  Staff 
generally work in a 
particular 
production area.  
Buffer of 
experienced 
agency 
workers. 
Ability to 
better align 
production 
demand/hours 
with staffing 
levels.  
Reduce slack.  
Control costs. 
Protect ‘core’. 
 
Segmentation 
of workforce 
into 
core/periphery 
with different 
levels of 
employment 
security. 
Some 
evidence of 
‘temp to 
perm’. 
Some long-
serving ‘stable 
agency’ 
workers 
unable to 
obtain 
permanent 
contracts.  
 
During 
recession  
(2008/9) 
All agency staff 
removed from the 
business.  
Protection of the 
‘core’ workforce 
but nevertheless a 
small number of 
voluntary 
redundancies.  
Reduce number of 
shifts and 
implementation of 
standard working 
week. 
Loss of shift pay. 
No reduction in 
working hours. 
Elimination of 
overtime working.  
Short-time for 
working for 
leadership team 
only.  
Some permanent 
staff redeployed 
from New Build to 
Aftermarket 
following 
downturn in New 
Build demand 
Ability to 
reduce costs 
by rapidly and 
easily 
reducing 
workforce 
size. 
Ability to 
reduce costs 
by eliminating 
overtime and 
shift 
allowance. 
Minimise 
redundancies. 
Protect ‘core’. 
All agency 
staff leave the 
business.  
Some 
remaining 
permanent 
workers 
expected to 
carry out 
different roles. 
Remaining 
permanent 
staff adopt 
different 
working 
patterns and 
lose shift 
allowance.  
Some 
voluntary 
redundancies 
for permanent 
staff.  
Recovery  Agency staff return Overtime offered 
to all staff during 
Limited 
functionality 
Ability to 
scale up 
Some former 
agency staff 
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(2009-2011) to business. busy periods. 
Increase number 
of shifts. 
Return of shift 
pay.  
flexibility. Staff 
generally work in 
same role.  
Agency staff 
sourced to fill 
vacancies.  
workforce to 
meet rising 
production 
demand 
re-join the 
business.  
Permanent 
workers 
continue in 
their new 
roles.  
 
 
Post-recession 
(2011-)  
Increased use of 
agency staff across 
production. 
Re-development of 
a buffer of ‘stable 
temps’. 
Develop of a new 
layer of ‘ad hoc 
temps’ use to fine 
tune staffing levels.  
Overtime in times 
of peak demand.  
New group of ad 
hoc agency 
workers with no 
guaranteed hours 
provide 
daily/hourly 
flexibility.  
Limited functional 
flexibility.  Staff 
generally work in 
same role. 
Ability to 
scale 
workforce up 
and down on a 
monthly, 
weekly, daily 
and hourly 
basis.  
Further reduce 
slack.  
Further reduce 
costs. 
Further 
segmentation 
of workforce 
into core,  
‘stable temps’ 
and ‘ad hoc 
temps with 
varying 
degrees of 
uncertainty. 
Limited 
evidence of 
‘temp to 
perm’. 
Some long-
serving ‘stable 
agency’ 
workers 
unable to 
obtain 
permanent 
contracts. 
Adhoc’ 
agency 
workers 
unable to 
obtain regular 
work.   
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